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ALIENABILITY OF MASS TORT CLAIMS
Lynn A. Baker*
INTRODUCTION
Whether the United States should follow the lead of the United
Kingdom and Australia in permitting innovative forms of litigation fi-
nancing for personal injury claims is a question of increasing interest
to policymakers and legal scholars.1  This Article seeks to contribute
to that larger conversation by examining a hypothetical regime with
expanded alienability of a particular subset of claims—claims in mass
torts, such as personal injury claims against pharmaceutical companies
involving drugs alleged to have harmful side effects.  I have chosen to
focus on this subset because I believe that the arguments in favor of
complete alienability of personal injury claims are strongest with re-
gard to these claims.  Moreover, many of the staunchest critics of al-
ternative litigation financing have expressed particular concern about
its implications in the mass tort context.2  Thus, any policy shifts to-
ward greater alienability of personal injury claims in the United States
would do well to focus on these claims.  And those not persuaded by
my analysis are unlikely to be persuaded by arguments for expanding
the alienability of personal injury claims more generally.
This Article begins by describing the current state of affairs for both
clients and their lawyers regarding the alienability and prosecution of
mass tort personal injury claims.  Despite various longstanding restric-
* Frederick M. Baron Chair in Law, University of Texas School of Law.  LBaker@law.
utexas.edu.  This Article was prepared for the 19th Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and
Social Policy, “A Brave New World: The Changing Face of Litigation and Law Firm Finance,”
held at DePaul University College of Law, April 18–19, 2013.  I am grateful to Steve Landsman
for inviting me to participate in the Symposium.  I am a consultant to law firms that handle mass
tort litigation and settlements, and serve as an expert witness on issues of legal ethics in mass tort
representations and settlements.  I have been involved as a consultant and/or expert in some of
the matters discussed in this Article.
1. See, e.g., ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES (2011) [hereinafter ABA WHITE PAPER]; Marco de Morpurgo, A Comparative Le-
gal and Economic Approach to Third-Party Litigation Funding, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP.
LAW 343 (2011); Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding,
95 MINN. L. REV. 1268 (2011).
2. See, e.g., JOHN BEISNER ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELLING LAW-
SUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES 8–9
(2009).
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tions on the alienability of personal injury claims in the United
States,3 substantial alienation of these claims is permitted, and is en-
gaged in by both clients and their attorneys.  In addition, Part II dis-
cusses the aspects of the prosecution of mass tort claims in the United
States that make these claims especially good candidates for complete
alienability.
Part III discusses the benefits and costs to mass tort claimants and
their attorneys of a hypothetical regime under which a claimant could
sell her entire claim to a law firm, rather than retain the firm to serve
as her counsel on a contingent fee basis.  The unique aspects of the
litigation and resolution of mass tort claims—scarcely discussed in the
literature on the alienability of claims—make them an especially apt
test case for relaxing the current restrictions on the alienation of
claims.  If the benefits of complete alienability do not exceed the costs
for these claims, it is unlikely that an analysis of any other category of
personal injury claims will yield a more attractive result.  Part III also
discusses various practical issues that would need to be resolved
before a claim-sale option for mass tort personal injury claims could
become a reality.  Part IV goes on to analyze the normative concerns
that underlie the existing constraints on claim sales.  It reveals that
none of these concerns is a persuasive grounds for prohibiting mass
tort claimants from selling their claims to an attorney (or, perhaps, to
any other potential purchaser).
It is not at all clear that a market for mass tort personal injury
claims would flourish even if the existing ethical and legal constraints
were relaxed.  But that possibility does not diminish the importance of
the Article’s larger conclusion that there are no compelling normative
or economic reasons to prohibit the complete alienability of mass tort
personal injury claims in the United States.
II. THE CURRENT ALIENABILITY AND PROSECUTION OF MASS
TORT CLAIMS IN THE UNITED STATES: FACTS
AND FALLACIES
In the United States today, an individual who has a personal injury
claim against a pharmaceutical manufacturer will often be one of
3. See, e.g., Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 62 (2011) (dis-
cussing legal doctrines that prohibit or limit property rights in litigation, including assignment
and maintenance and noting that “[a]ssignment of personal injury tort claims is prohibited
throughout the United States”); Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114
YALE L.J. 697, 699–700 (2005) (noting that some courts “have begun to view restraints on aliena-
tion skeptically” but that “[b]usinesses devoted to purchasing and prosecuting claims remain
legally problematic at best”).
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thousands of individuals with similar claims.  If she contacts an attor-
ney regarding her claim, she may have chosen the attorney based on
an Internet, television, or print advertisement, a Google search, or as
a result of the recommendation of a family member or friend.4  If,
after the initial consultation, she and the attorney mutually decide to
pursue her claim, she will almost certainly retain the law firm on a
contingent fee basis, signing a standard contract that the firm
provides.
The firm will begin to “work up” the case of the injured person,
obtaining the relevant medical and pharmacy records, perhaps with
the injured person’s assistance.  These records will be used by the firm
to confirm that the injured person has legally cognizable proof of hav-
ing taken the relevant drug during the requisite time period and for
the requisite duration.  In addition, the firm will seek to confirm that
the injured person has legally cognizable proof of having suffered a
compensable injury that has been linked scientifically to use of the
relevant drug.  Eventually, the firm will need to provide this proof of
use and proof of injury to the defendant to obtain any compensation
for the injured person’s claim through a settlement.  At some point,
prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the firm will either
file the injured person’s claim in court or enter into a tolling agree-
ment with the defendant regarding the claim.
Typically, several years will pass during which many of the
thousands of cases filed throughout the country are consolidated into
a handful of courts, and the parties conduct pretrial discovery.  Cases
filed in federal courts may be transferred to a multidistrict litigation
(MDL) court chosen by the MDL panel.5  Cases filed in state courts
may also be consolidated in various ways.6  Lawyers in the firm that is
4. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LE-
GAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 47–48, 48 tbl.3.1 (2004) (empirical study showing that the
sources of clients for personal injury attorneys in Wisconsin were: client referrals (26%), lawyer
referrals (19%), yellow pages advertisements (16%), community contacts (14%), existing clients
(11%), other advertising other than direct mail (8%), direct mail (<1%), other (6%)); Stephen
Daniels & Joanne Martin, It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times: The Precarious
Nature of Plaintiffs’ Practice in Texas, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1781, 1789 tbl.4 (2002) (empirical study
showing that the primary sources of clients for different types of contingency fee attorneys in
Texas were: referrals from former clients (18%–36%) and referrals from other lawyers
(20%–55%)).
5. For useful discussions of the MDL process, see generally Deborah R. Hensler, The Role of
Multi-Districting in Mass Tort Litigation: An Empirical Investigation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV.
883 (2001); Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation If a Class
Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205 (2008).
6. See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 5, at 2209 (noting that the MDL model “has recently spread
to state courts with some sixteen states creating statewide MDLs or ‘coordinated proceedings’
for transfer of all cases relating to a particular kind of litigation to a single judge”). See generally
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representing the injured person may or may not be among those cho-
sen by the MDL court to serve on the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee
(PSC) and take a leadership role in the discovery and pretrial
processes.7  Similarly, the law firm representing the injured person
may or may not be directly involved in the concurrent proceedings in
the various state courts.
The cases with the earliest trial dates in various state and federal
courts will begin to receive the concentrated attention of the firms
retained by those clients, as well as by the PSC, their associated trial
counsel, and any state court equivalents of the PSC and their associ-
ated attorneys.  The MDL judge may establish a procedure for select-
ing bellwether cases for trials in federal court, and the trial dates and
venues will be set for that handful of cases.8  Many of the cases with
the earliest trial dates will settle on the courthouse steps, and some of
those settlements may include other claimants represented by the
same law firm.  Trials will begin in a few cases, with some proceeding
to a verdict while others settle during the trial.
Through this process of discovery, selecting bellwether cases for
trial, and preparing for the first trials in state and federal court, coun-
sel throughout the country for both the plaintiffs and the defendant
will receive increasing information about the strengths and weak-
nesses of specific cases and of the general case for the defendant’s
liability.  Any cases tried to a verdict will provide especially salient
information on these issues, particularly regarding cases filed in the
same court.  All of this information will help establish the larger “mar-
ket” for claims involving the pharmaceutical at issue, and will influ-
ence significantly the expected settlement values for claims with
particular characteristics.
All of the above means that after a law firm takes on its first clients
with claims against the pharmaceutical defendant, it will typically be
several years before the firm will be able to negotiate settlement of-
fers with the pharmaceutical defendant for some or all of the firm’s
William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism in Action: Coordination of Litigation in State
and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689 (1992).
7. For a critical discussion of the process by which attorneys are chosen for MDL leadership
positions, see Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing
Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 118–20 (2010).  See
also Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Contingency Fees in Mass Torts: Access, Risk, and the
Provision of Legal Services When Layers of Lawyers Work for Individuals and the Collectives of
Clients, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 425, 430–32 (1998); Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,”
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 5, 29–35, 50.
8. See Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323
(2008); see also Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576 (2008).
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“inventory” of claims.  During that period, the law firm will receive no
revenue from the claims but will nonetheless be incurring, at a mini-
mum, both the usual costs of operating the law firm and the costs of
filing and investigating the client’s claims (e.g., obtaining the individ-
ual client’s medical and pharmacy records, advancing the costs of spe-
cialized medical testing such as echocardiograms for fen-phen
claimants, interviewing the client, and having the client complete a
detailed questionnaire regarding her drug use and medical history).
If the law firm has a case with an early trial date, it will also incur
substantial expense as it hires experts on the pharmaceutical defen-
dant’s liability, on the science of the drug at issue, and on critical as-
pects of the trial plaintiff’s case, and as it takes and defends
depositions and otherwise engages in pretrial discovery against the de-
fendant corporation.  If one of the firm’s lawyers has secured a cov-
eted position in the leadership of the federal MDL (or a state
equivalent), the firm will also be making significant financial invest-
ments in that enterprise.  These may take the form of direct cash con-
tributions, often in $100,000 increments, to the operating account of
the MDL, or direct funding of specified aspects of the nationwide pre-
trial discovery process that is coordinated through the MDL.9
As the months and years pass, the law firm may need to secure
outside financial assistance to continue to meet its monthly overhead
as well as to continue to pursue its clients’ claims against the pharma-
ceutical defendant.  The firm may draw upon an established line of
credit with its bank. Individual shareholders may loan personal funds
to their firm.  Or the firm may even borrow money from a specialized
litigation funding company that may offer the firm a nonrecourse
loan, but only at a high effective interest rate and after a thorough
examination of the firm’s inventory of cases against the defendant.10
9. The Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee (PSC) of an MDL typically establishes a fund for
“shared costs” into which each member of the PSC contributes throughout the course of the
litigation. See, e.g., In re Bausch & Lomb Contact Lens Solution Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No.
1785, No. 2:06-MN-77777-DCN, 2008 WL 2330571, at *5 (D.S.C. May 21, 2008) (order establish-
ing common benefit fund) (“Shared Costs are costs that will be paid out of the PSC Fund admin-
istered by Plaintiffs’ Personal Injury Lead Counsel.  Each PSC member shall contribute to the
PSC Fund at times and in amounts sufficient to cover plaintiffs’ expenses for the administration
of the MDL.”); see also Glenn Collins, A Tobacco Case’s Legal Buccaneers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,
1995, at D1 (discussing ad hoc consortium of sixty plaintiffs’ firms that contributed $100,000 each
to fund litigation against tobacco companies); Glenn Collins, Judge Allows Big Lawsuit on To-
bacco, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1995, at 1 (same).
10. See, e.g., ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 4–6, 8–9; STEVEN GARBER, RAND CORP.,
ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND
UNKNOWNS 8–9, 13 (2010).
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Another way for the firm to secure financial assistance is by, in es-
sence, selling other law firms a portion of its anticipated fees from its
cases against the pharmaceutical defendant.  The sharing of fees by
contingent fee lawyers is a long-standing practice11 that is ethically
permissible in every state so long as certain, typically undemanding,
requirements are met.12
As the months and years pass, the firm’s client may also be in in-
creasing financial distress as she waits to receive a settlement offer
from the pharmaceutical defendant.  The client is, after all, an injured
person.  If she is seriously injured, she may have substantially reduced
earning capacity or may no longer be able to work at all.  She has
likely received, and may continue to need, medical treatment that may
only partially, if at all, be covered by insurance.  In order to pay her
ordinary monthly living expenses, she may begin to draw upon any
savings, carry the maximum (high-interest) balance on her credit
cards, and borrow money from relatives and friends.
The injured person may also (or instead) turn to an “advance fund-
ing” loan company, which will provide her a nonrecourse cash ad-
vance on her anticipated settlement funds at a high interest rate.13  In
deciding whether to provide the injured person any funds, the loan
company will typically require information from both the injured per-
son and her law firm regarding the facts surrounding her injuries and
medical condition, as well as the nature of her legal claim against the
pharmaceutical defendant.  Because this is a nonrecourse loan, the in-
11. The sharing of fees as a means of funding the plaintiff side of mass tort litigation has been
well documented at least as early as the Agent Orange litigation. See PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT
ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 46–47, 51–53 (1986); see also KIP
PETROFF WITH SUZI ZIMMERMAN PETROFF, BATTLING GOLIATH: INSIDE A $22 BILLION LEGAL
SCANDAL 103–05 (2011).
12. ABA Model Rule 1.5(e), on which most states’ ethics rules governing fees are based, has
long provided that “[a] division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be
made” so long as all of the following conditions are met:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each law-
yer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;
(2) the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive,
and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and
(3) the total fee is reasonable.
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.5(e) (2013); see also STEPHEN GILLERS ET AL., REGULATION
OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 2013, at 185–86 (detailing history of adoption of cur-
rent Model Rule 1.5).
In recent years, a few states, including Texas, have imposed additional restrictions on fee shar-
ing among attorneys, restrictions that arguably do not benefit the clients of the affected attor-
neys. See Lynn A. Baker, The Politics of Legal Ethics: Case Study of a Rule Change, 53 ARIZ. L.
REV. 425 (2011); see also GILLERS ET AL., supra, at 186–91 (summarizing selected state varia-
tions on ABA Model Rule 1.5).
13. See, e.g., GARBER, supra note 10, at 9–12.
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jured person will be obligated to pay back the cash advance only if she
ultimately both receives and accepts an offer to settle her claims
against the pharmaceutical defendant.14  If the injured person accepts
a future settlement offer, the loan company (as well as the injured
person’s contingent fee lawyers and any governmental or private
health insurance providers) will have an enforceable lien against her
settlement proceeds.
Some injured persons may die between the time that they hire a law
firm to pursue their claims and the time that the firm is able to negoti-
ate a settlement offer on their behalf.  In many of these cases, the
injured person’s claims become a part of her estate, and a court-ap-
pointed personal representative will stand in the shoes of the deceased
claimant with regard to the decision whether to accept a settlement
offer from the pharmaceutical defendant.
As time goes on, a law firm that has taken out loans to pay its
monthly overhead and the continuing costs of the litigation will be
driven by the increasing financial pressures both to agree to a settle-
ment of its inventory of claims against the pharmaceutical defendant
and to accept a lower total settlement amount than would a law firm
for which it is less costly to continue to hold out in the hope of eventu-
ally negotiating a higher total settlement amount.  Once a settlement
is reached, the agreement will typically provide the plaintiffs’ firm a
set amount of money for a specified number of claims that meet cer-
tain criteria.  Allocating those funds to provide an individual settle-
ment offer for each of the firm’s potentially eligible claimants will
usually be left to the law firm.
When the law firm subsequently presents the individual settlement
offers to each of its potentially eligible clients, those clients who are
feeling the greatest financial pressure will be most eager to accept the
settlement offer, whether or not they believe the offer to be a good
one.  Counterintuitively, the clients who have received an advance on
their settlement payment from a loan company may be the least inter-
ested in accepting their settlement offer.  Depending on the terms of
the loan a client has taken out and on how long prior to the settlement
the client received the loan funds, the accrued interest may total the
entire net value of the settlement.  In this case, there is no reason for
the injured person to accept the settlement offer since doing so will
14. See id. at 9–10.  The fact that the injured person is not obligated to pay back the nonre-
course loan unless she accepts a settlement offer predictably results in some injured person’s
rationally determining that there is no reason to accept the settlement offer in instances in which
the injured person will net nothing more than the amount of the loan already received from the
litigation loan company.
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not put any additional money in her pocket.  Her entire settlement
will go to repay her advance funding loan (and any accrued interest
and fees), and to pay attorneys’ fees, reimburse litigation expenses
incurred by the law firm on her behalf, pay any MDL assessment,15
and pay any governmental or private medical liens related to the inju-
ries at issue.16
A few key points merit emphasis:
• In modern mass tort litigation, very few cases go to trial.  In the
Vioxx litigation that was largely resolved through a $4.95 billion
nationwide settlement in 2009, more than 47,000 claimants had
filed cases and were potentially eligible to participate in the set-
tlement, but only 16 cases involving 17 claimants were tried.17
15. In order to fund the work of an MDL’s leadership and “common benefit” attorneys, the
MDL court typically issues an order establishing a “common benefit fee and expense fund.” See,
e.g., Case Management Order No. 14 (Establishing Common Benefit Fee and Expense Fund) at
5, In re Yasmin and Yaz (Dropsirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices and Relevant Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2013) (establishing assessment of 6% (4% for
common benefit attorneys’ fees and 2% for costs) for “Early Participation Counsel,” and assess-
ment of 10% (8% for fees and 2% for costs) for “Late Participation Counsel”); see also Silver &
Miller, supra note 7, at 131 (discussing common benefit assessment).
16. Given all this, it will not be surprising that the injured person’s attorney in such a case will
have an interest in negotiating with the injured person’s advanced funding loan company in
order to obtain a reduction in the injured person’s loan repayment amount so that the injured
person will have some financial incentive to accept the settlement offer.  At the time the settle-
ment offer is made in such a case, the injured person’s attorney and the loan company will often
have the largest stakes in the injured person’s settlement funds.  And neither the attorney nor
the loan company receives any money at all in connection with the injured person’s claim if the
injured person does not accept the settlement offer.  Attempting to negotiate a reduction in the
interest that the injured person owes the loan company is typically more attractive to the plain-
tiff’s attorney than simply reducing her own fee, not only because the attorney will typically
prefer a larger fee to a smaller one, but also because the attorney’s disclosure obligations under
the “aggregate settlement” rule may preclude (or greatly complicate) any such reduction in fees.
See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-438 (2006).
17. See Client Cover Letter, OFFICIAL VIOXX SETTLEMENT, http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.
com/documents/Client%20Cover%20Letter%20-%20FINAL.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) (of-
ficial letter to Vioxx claimants summarizing the litigation history and settlement).  It is especially
significant that only 16 of 47,000 Vioxx cases were tried, because the defendant, Merck & Co.,
repeatedly stated throughout the litigation that it intended to try every single case. See, e.g.,
Alex Berenson, Plaintiffs Find Payday Elusive in Vioxx Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2007, at A1
(“Promising to contest every case, Merck has spent more than $1 billion over the last three years
in legal fees.  It has refused, at least publicly, to consider even the possibility of an overall settle-
ment to resolve all the lawsuits at once.”); Alex Berenson, Merck Suffers a Pair of Setbacks Over
Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2006, at C1 (noting that Merck “says it did nothing wrong in re-
searching or marketing [Vioxx] and plans to defend every lawsuit”); Lewis Krauskopf, Merck
Agrees to Pay $4.85 Billion in Vioxx Settlement, REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2007, 3:52 PM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2007/11/10/businesspro-merck-vioxx-settlement-dc-idUSL0929726620071110
(“The settlement marks a shift in strategy for Merck, which previously said it intended to fight
Vioxx litigation on a case-by-[case] basis rather than consider a broad settlement.”).
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• Some (perhaps many) law firms that represent hundreds or
thousands of claims against a particular defendant involving a
particular drug will not try any of those cases.
• It is possible for a law firm that reaches a settlement agreement
with a pharmaceutical defendant regarding a large inventory of
claims to have already sold, or alienated, nearly all of the value
of its original contractual fee interest through a combination of
fee-sharing with other lawyers and loans (plus accrued interest)
from nonlawyer financial entities such as lines of credit at a
bank.
• It is possible for an injured person who receives a settlement
offer as part of a law firm’s group settlement with a defendant to
have already sold, or alienated, nearly all of her recovery
through an advanced funding loan (plus accrued interest), in ad-
dition to attorneys’ fees, reimbursable litigation expenses, and
governmental and private medical liens.
III. ALIENABILITY OF THE MASS TORT CLIENT’S CLAIM
Consider a hypothetical regime under which an injured person with
a claim against a pharmaceutical defendant has the option to sell her
claim to a law firm, rather than retain the firm to represent her on a
contingent fee basis.  As discussed above, currently in the United
States, it is possible—and entirely permissible—for an individual with
a mass tort personal injury claim to have liquidated the entire value of
that claim prior to its resolution with the defendant.  If the injured
person has retained legal counsel to prosecute the claim on her behalf,
the law firm will now have a significant (typically 40%) contingent fee
interest in her claim.  In addition, the firm will have a lien against any
future recovery for the reimbursement of certain litigation-related ex-
penses incurred on the client’s behalf.  Similarly, governmental and
private providers of health insurance may have liens for the repay-
ment of medical expenses incurred on behalf of the injured person in
connection with the injury that is the focus of the claim.  Finally, the
injured person may have obtained a nonrecourse “advanced funding”
loan from a finance company that she is also obligated to repay, with
interest, from any proceeds resulting from the resolution of her claim.
At the present time in the United States, however, an individual
with a mass tort personal injury claim is not permitted simply to sell
that claim outright to an attorney—or anyone else other than the de-
fendant(s)—at the outset of the litigation process, or at any other
time.  There are three broad categories of limitations on the complete
alienability of the claim: (1) prohibitions on maintenance, champerty,
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and barratry;18 (2) “a refusal by some courts to enforce contracts pur-
porting to sell choses in action”;19 and (3) state bar rules of profes-
sional responsibility that prohibit attorneys from acquiring a
proprietary interest in a client’s cause of action or providing financial
assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated
litigation.20
Others have recently documented the contemporary trends toward
limiting, rather than expanding, these prohibitions and have debated
the normative appeal of such changes.21  In addition, several legal
scholars have provided useful analyses of the potential costs and bene-
fits, both economic and noneconomic, of generally permitting the
18. See, e.g., ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 9–12 (discussing the history and contempo-
rary views on maintenance, champerty, and barratry); Abramowicz, supra note 3, at 699 &
nn.4–6 (2005) (citing sources and observing that the common law doctrines of barratry, mainte-
nance, and champerty “collectively form one of two legal obstacles to the development of legal
claims markets”); Sebok, supra note 3, at 72–74, 94–120 (discussing past and present laws regu-
lating maintenance and champerty); Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims,
16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329, 330–34 (1987) (discussing the historical and current legal doctrines that
bar the operation of a market in personal injury tort claims); Steinitz, supra note 1, at 1286–92
(discussing history of maintenance, champerty, and lawyers sharing fees with nonlawyers); Ari
Dobner, Comment, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1543–57 (1996) (discussing
history and present state of champerty laws in the United States).
19. Abramowicz, supra note 3, at 699–700, 700 nn.7–8 (discussing current law regarding as-
signability of various types of claims); see also Sebok, supra note 3, at 72–94 (discussing past and
present laws regulating assignments of claims).
20. See ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 19–21 (discussing ABA Model Rule 1.8(e),
which prohibits a lawyer from providing financial assistance to a client except in specified cir-
cumstances, and ABA Model Rule 1.8(i), which prohibits a lawyer from acquiring a proprietary
interest in the client’s cause of action, except in specified circumstances).  Texas is a notable
exception, in that “legal claims are generally assignable, and the bar on champerty has been
lifted, but barratry remains a criminal offense and the courts have found that certain classes of
cases, such as malpractice, are not assignable.”  Abramowicz, supra note 3, at 700–01 (footnotes
omitted) (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.014(a) (West 2004) (“[A]n interest in a cause of
action on which suit has been filed may be sold, regardless of whether the judgment or cause of
action is assignable in law or equity, if the transfer is in writing.”); Beech Aircraft Corp. v.
Jinkins, 739 S.W.2d 19, 22 (Tex. 1987) (discussing assignability of claim); Perry v. Smith, 231 S.W.
340, 342 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1921) (discussing lifting of bar on champerty); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 38.12(a)(1) (West 2003) (making it a crime to “knowingly institute[ ] a suit or claim that
the person has not been authorized to pursue”); Medlock v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 24
S.W.3d 865 (Tex. App. 2000) (upholding discipline against an attorney accused of barratry).  Fur-
ther complicating matters in Texas is the fact that the Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.08(h) is identical to ABA Model Rule 1.8(i) in prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring a
proprietary interest in the client’s cause of action, except in similar specified circumstances.
Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(i) (2013), with TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.08(h) (2005).
21. See generally, e.g., BEISNER ET AL., supra note 2; GARBER, supra note 10; Abramowicz,
supra note 3; Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance
Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55 (2004); Jonathan T. Molot,
A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (2009); Sebok, supra note 3; Shukaitis, supra
note 18; Steinitz, supra note 1; Dobner, supra note 18.
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alienability of legal claims.22  This Article seeks to advance both of
those discussions by offering an analysis of the potential costs and
benefits of permitting mass tort personal injury claimants to sell their
claims outright to attorneys.  I have chosen to focus on this particular
subset of potential buyers and sellers of legal claims because substan-
tial partial alienation of mass tort claims is already permitted and reg-
ularly occurs.  Thus, it is especially interesting to consider what the
likely effects of the next step—permitting complete alienation to an
attorney—might be.23  In addition, there are other unique aspects of
the litigation and resolution of mass tort claims, not previously ex-
plored in the literature on the alienability of claims, that make them
an especially good test case for relaxing the current restrictions on the
alienation of claims.  If an analysis of the expected effects of permit-
ting complete alienation of mass tort claims reveals that the costs are
likely to exceed the benefits, it is highly improbable that an analysis of
any other category of personal injury claims will yield a more compel-
ling case for relaxing the current restrictions.
A. Benefits to Mass Tort Clients of Lifting the Prohibitions on
Complete Alienation
If mass tort personal injury claimants had the option to sell their
entire claim to an attorney rather than granting the attorney the typi-
cal 40% contingent fee interest in the claim, many of the benefits to
the clients would be straightforward and would be the same benefits
that other types of claimants would realize if similarly permitted to
sell their entire claim.  Most obviously, the clients would be able to
receive their settlement funds sooner and with greater certainty re-
garding the net value of their claim.  Importantly, such a regime would
have numerous other benefits for clients—especially mass tort claim-
ants—that have not previously been discussed by scholars.24  Some of
these expected benefits may be unique to, or greater for, mass tort
claimants as a result of both the nature of mass tort claims and the
type of attorney-client relationship that is typically involved.
22. See generally, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 3; Molot, supra note 21; Sebok, supra note 3;
Shukaitis, supra note 18.
23. It merits underscoring that I am not especially wedded to the idea that the claim purchaser
be an attorney.  I have specified an attorney as the purchaser in my analysis simply as a way of
taking the smallest possible next step in relaxing the current restrictions, given the existence and
acceptability of the contingent fee.
24. To date, the special issues surrounding the alienability of mass tort claims have received
only a few pages of attention in the law reviews. See Ryan Guerrero, Note, Reevaluating Pro-
posals for Tort Claims Markets in a World of Mass Tort Litigation, 32 REV. LITIG. 299, 314–22
(2013).
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First, concerns about any inefficiencies or apparent lack of competi-
tiveness in the market for contingent fee mass tort attorneys would
dissipate for those claimants who chose to sell their claims.  Some
scholars have argued that there is substantial uniformity in the fees
charged by these attorneys, which suggests that the market for those
services is not sufficiently competitive and perhaps even collusive.25
Other scholars contend that this market is competitive, but that the
competition sometimes occurs not with regard to the fee charged but
rather with regard to the level and quality of service provided for the
fee.26  These scholars go on to question the ability of claimants to ob-
tain useful information on this service variable when deciding which
attorney or firm to retain.27  Finally, some of these critics contend that
the typical 40% fee charged by these attorneys is in any event too
large and does not accurately reflect what the critics argue is the mini-
mal risk of nonrecovery borne by the contingent fee attorney in most
cases.28
25. See, e.g., LESTER BRICKMAN, LAWYER BARONS: WHAT THEIR CONTINGENCY FEES RE-
ALLY COST AMERICA 6 (2011); Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of
Champions or a Market for Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 656–68 (1995).
26. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, How Lawyers Compete, REGULATION, Summer 2004, at
38, 38 (noting that “[t]he absence of price competition . . . does not mean that there is no compe-
tition at all.  Lawyers can compete on quality.”).  Herb Kritzer has provided substantial empiri-
cal evidence to support his claim that “there is substantial variation in the contingency fee
system vis-a`-vis the fees charged,” but adds that he has “no evidence that indicates that the
variation reflects market competition.” KRITZER, supra note 4, at 42. See also John Fabian Witt,
Bureaucratic Legalism, American Style: Private Bureaucratic Legalism and the Governance of the
Tort System, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 261, 279 (2007) (noting that “despite some limited evidence of
price competition in the plaintiffs’ market, the price term in plaintiffs’-side personal injury re-
tainers is remarkably sticky”).
27. See, e.g., BRICKMAN, supra note 25, at 75–78.  Kritzer’s empirical evidence that personal
injury attorneys receive 37% of their cases through client referrals (26%) and existing clients
(11%) suggests, however, that a significant portion of clients will have some useful information
on attorneys’ quality of service. See KRITZER, supra note 4, at 48 tbl.3.1, 61–63.  In addition, as
Michael Abramowicz notes, “everyone knows the difference between the luxe interiors of the
offices of the high-end plaintiffs’ bar and the storefront offices of lawyers who may have barely
passed the bar exam.”  Abramowicz, supra note 26, at 39.  For Abramowicz, the more likely
difficulty that clients face is “to identify the claims for which lawyer quality is more important”
and “how to balance price/quality tradeoffs.” Id.  Nora Freeman Engstrom identifies a different
source of apparent market failure: “[C]ontingency fee clients are, for a number of reasons,
uniquely insensitive to the prices they pay.  Much like health insurance appears to blunt patients’
sensitivity to the cost of medical care, clients’ contingency fee insensitivity may help to explain
the long-identified oddities of the personal injury marketplace.”  Nora Freeman Engstrom, At-
torney Advertising and the Contingency Fee Cost Paradox, 65 STAN. L. REV. 633, 692 (2013).
28. See, e.g., BRICKMAN, supra note 25, at 4–5; Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without
Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 30–32 (1989);
Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing Data and Non-
Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 653, 664 (2003) (“I conclude that the market for contingent-
fee financed tort claims is not competitive and that the uniform pricing which prevails is a prod-
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At the core of each of these contentions is, ultimately, a difficult
empirical question to which no definitive answer has yet been given.
Each of those questions, however, would become irrelevant to claim-
ants who might choose to sell their claims rather than retain an attor-
ney on a contingent fee basis, since no attorneys’ fees, contingent or
otherwise, would be involved.  Rather, the claimant would be able to
compare the dollar values (i.e., net recoveries) offered for her claim
by various law firms in much the same way that she might comparison
shop for peanut butter or a new set of tires.  Thus, scholars and others
concerned about a potential lack of competitiveness in the market for
contingent attorneys’ fees should be especially inclined to celebrate a
regime under which claimants had the option to simply sell their
claims to an attorney.29
A second, previously undiscussed benefit of a claim-sale option is
that the settlement offer received by a mass tort claimant would be
likely to more accurately reflect the relative strength of the individ-
ual’s claim.  All types of claims might reap this benefit from a sale-
option regime, but mass tort personal injury claims are especially
likely to do so.  The reason is that under the current regime, the even-
tual gross settlement value of an individual’s mass tort personal injury
claim will be significantly affected by a number of factors that are
both uniquely present in the mass tort context and have little to do
with the strength of an individual’s claim.
In the mass tort context, an individual, Anna, who has chosen Firm
A to represent her, may have a personal injury claim involving Drug
X that is identical in all potentially relevant respects to that of Betty,
who has retained Firm B.  Both women may have taken Drug X in the
same dose for the same period of time and beginning on approxi-
mately the same date, both may have suffered the same type of injury
on approximately the same date, and both may have similar medical
and personal histories.  Thus, given the comparable “merits” of their
claims within the tort system,30 one would expect Anna and Betty to
uct of collusive behavior by contingency-fee lawyers to generate rents.”); Painter, supra note 25,
at 649–50.
29. Indeed, Lester Brickman, a long-time, prominent critic of contingent fees, would seem to
subscribe to this view, albeit without particular reference to attorneys as the potential purchasers
of claims. See BRICKMAN, supra note 25, at 18, 93 (suggesting that rules forbidding the outright
sale of claims insulate contingency fee lawyers from market competition).  As I explain supra at
n.23, I have specified an attorney as the purchaser in my analysis simply as a way of taking the
smallest possible next step in relaxing the current restrictions, given the acceptability of the con-
tingent fee.  In some respects, of course, having an attorney as the claim purchaser may raise
additional issues. See, e.g., ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 1.
30. There is no single accepted or uncontroversial way to evaluate the “merits” or “value” of a
claim, either in a vacuum or relative to other claims against the same defendant.  Two common
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receive comparable gross settlement offers.  At present, however, it is
likely that these two women will end up receiving different—perhaps
substantially different—gross settlement offers for their claims unless
they are represented by the same firm and receive their settlement
offers pursuant to the same group settlement agreement.31
There are many causes of this variation in gross settlement offers
for individuals like Anna and Betty who have claims of similar merit.
Differences in the total group settlement offers negotiated by differ-
ent law firms are a primary source of the variation.  With rare excep-
tion, the defendant will negotiate with individual law firms, firm by
firm, to settle the entire inventory of Drug X claims held by each.32
Thus, Firm A and Firm B may both have inventories of 1,000 claims
but may ultimately negotiate with the defendant substantially differ-
ent total settlement offer amounts for their respective inventories.
Those different total dollar amounts may in part reflect the different
composition of each firm’s group of claims in terms of the severity and
types of the claimants’ injuries, as well as other aspects of the relative
“merits” of their claims within the tort system.33  The dollar amounts
negotiated for the two inventories, however, may also reflect factors
having nothing to do with the merits of the relevant claims, such as:
the bargaining skills of the negotiating plaintiffs’ lawyers; the financial
ability of each plaintiffs’ law firm to hold out (potentially many
models of claim valuation are the “economic” model, which focuses on the expected value of a
plaintiff’s claim at trial, and the “satisficing” model, which involves a set of criteria or aspirations
to be satisfied at a threshold level, such as “putting the plaintiff in the financial position she
would have been in but for the injury,” discounted for the probability that the defendant was not
(fully) responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries. See Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You
Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs’ Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465,
1518–22 (1998).
31. Even if two clients with similar claims are represented by the same attorney, they may
receive significantly different settlement offers if they are not part of the same settlement agree-
ment.  There are a number of ways this might occur.  For example, the attorney who represents
each of them might have entered into more than one group settlement with the defendant, with
each of the two clients included in different groups; or the attorney who represents each of them
might have referred out some claims for inclusion in a different settlement negotiated by a dif-
ferent lead law firm while also being the lead lawyer in negotiating his own settlement agree-
ment; or the attorney whom the two clients share may not have been the lead attorney in
negotiating any settlement agreement, but simply referred out his cases to various attorneys for
inclusion in their separate settlements.
32. The defendant will typically request information from the firm regarding each of its claims
including, for example, the dates of prescriptions for the drug, the dates and types of subsequent
injuries claimed to have been caused by the drug, dates and types of any medical procedures
related to those injuries, and other potentially relevant information regarding the claimant’s
medical history. Based in part on its evaluation of that information, the defendant will negotiate
a total settlement offer amount with the law firm for its inventory of claims.
33. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
2014] ALIENABILITY OF MASS TORT CLAIMS 279
months) for a potentially larger settlement amount;34 the general risk
preferences of each law firm; whether a law firm is among the first or
the last to negotiate a Drug X settlement with the defendant; whether
a law firm’s inventory includes one or more claims with an imminent
(or early) trial date and the strength of the relevant claim(s); and
whether the law firm has an attorney who is playing a leading role on
the MDL Steering Committee, or who is otherwise perceived by the
defendant to be an especially formidable adversary at trial or on
appeal.35
Even if Firm A and Firm B each negotiate the same total gross set-
tlement offer amount from the defendant for their respective invento-
ries of 1,000 claims, it is still likely that Anna and Betty will be offered
different amounts to settle their individual claims.  This is because the
defendant’s settlement agreement with a plaintiffs’ law firm typically
will not specify the individual gross amount to be offered to each qual-
34. The ability (as distinct from the willingness) of a law firm to “hold out” in settlement
negotiations will largely be a function of how well capitalized the law firm is.  A firm that is
financing the litigation from its own cash reserves would be expected to feel much less pressure
to settle early than a firm that is incurring substantial interest costs each month from a line of
credit or other form of litigation funding loan.  This variable seems especially likely to affect
both the gross and net settlement value of a mass tort client’s claim, but is an issue about which a
client typically will have no particular reason to ask or investigate when choosing a law firm.  I
am not aware of any way for potential clients easily to get this information, short of asking a firm
directly.  In some instances, however, clients may be able to infer the existence, or future likeli-
hood, of such a loan from statements in the contingent fee agreement regarding expenses.  If the
agreement discloses that interest on loans that might be obtained for advancing litigation ex-
penses may be charged to the client in the event of a recovery, the client may at least have more
reason (and opportunity) than otherwise to inquire about how the firm anticipates funding the
relevant litigation.
35. This variable is relevant insofar as an increasingly standard provision in mass tort settle-
ment agreements is the affirmation of the signatory plaintiffs’ law firm that, to the extent permit-
ted by the relevant state(s)’ ethics rules, the firm will undertake to withdraw from further
representing any claimant who might decline her settlement offer.  See, for example, Settlement
Agreement Between Merck & Co., Inc. and the Counsel Listed on the Signature Pages Hereto
§ 1.2.8, at 5–6 (Nov. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Vioxx Settlement Agreement], available at http://www.
officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents/Master%20Settlement%20Agreement%20-%20new.
pdf, which states in relevant part:
1.2.8.  While nothing in this Agreement is intended to operate as a “restriction” on the
right of any Claimant’s counsel to practice law within the meaning of the equivalent to
Rule 5.6(b) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct in any jurisdictions in
which Claimant’s Counsel practices or whose rules may otherwise apply, it is agreed
that . . . :
. . . .
1.2.8.2.  If any such Eligible Claimant disregards such recommendation [of Claimant’s
Counsel to enroll in the settlement program] . . . to the extent permitted by the
equivalents to Rules 1.16 and 5.6 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct in
the relevant jurisdiction(s), [Counsel shall] (i) take . . . all necessary steps to disengage
and withdraw from the representation of such Eligible Claimant . . . .
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ifying covered claimant to settle her claim.36  Rather, the defendant
will likely explicitly leave to the plaintiffs’ counsel the responsibility
for allocating the total group settlement amount into the individual
gross settlement offers to be made to each of the claimants covered by
the settlement agreement.
In making their respective allocations, Firm A and Firm B may each
arrive in good faith at a matrix or formula that treats like cases alike
but which simultaneously values Anna’s and Betty’s claims signifi-
cantly differently.  This may reflect the two firms’ different treatment
of certain aspects of the claims about which reasonable and informed
plaintiffs’ attorneys simply disagree.  For example, Firm A might re-
duce a gross claim value by 50% if the claimant had been a smoker
while taking Drug X, while Firm B might impose only a 35%
reduction.
Different valuations for Anna’s and Betty’s claims may also reflect
differences in the overall composition of the two firms’ inventories.
For example, Anna’s and Betty’s alleged injuries from Drug X may be
of moderate severity given the range of possible injuries and when
considered relative to the nationwide pool of claims.  Within Firm A’s
inventory, however, Anna’s claim may be one of a small number in-
volving relatively severe injuries and it may thus be allocated a gross
value well above the per-case average for the group.  Firm B’s inven-
tory, however, might include mostly claims involving injuries compa-
rable to Betty’s in their severity, with only a few claims involving more
severe or less severe injuries.  Betty’s claim may therefore be allo-
cated a gross settlement value right at the per-case average for the
group.
Further, consider a different example in which (1) the distribution
of the severity of injuries is substantially similar among claimants in
the Firm A and Firm B inventories, and (2) injuries such as Anna’s
and Betty’s are considered to be in the top 10% of both inventories in
terms of their severity.  Firm A, however, might conclude that claims
such as Anna’s should receive six times the per-case average for its
36. It is an increasingly common preference of defendants in “inventory” settlements to spec-
ify in the master settlement agreement with the plaintiffs’ counsel that responsibility for allocat-
ing the total settlement offer amount to individual settling claimants covered by the settlement
agreement is the sole responsibility of the signatory law firm and that the parties expressly dis-
claim that the defendant has any responsibility for, or role in, that allocation process.  The na-
tionwide Vioxx settlement was a notable exception in this regard, insofar as the Settlement
Agreement included numerous Exhibits, agreed to by the defendant, that set out the “Points
Award Methodology/Criteria” and other criteria that would be used to determine each claim-
ant’s settlement offer amount. See id. at iv (“Table of Exhibits and Schedules”).
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inventory; Firm B, meanwhile, might conclude that such claims (in-
cluding Betty’s) should receive only three times the per-case average.
Thus, under the current regime, Anna and Betty will frequently be
offered substantially different gross amounts to settle their very simi-
lar claims as a result of factors that have little to do with the relative
merits of their claims within the tort system.  It is important to note,
however, that none of this variation among law firms in their ultimate
valuations of claims is inherently problematic as a matter of legal eth-
ics or of the relevant attorneys’ fiduciary obligations.  This variation in
gross settlement offer values will occur even if Firm A and Firm B are
both acting entirely reasonably and in good faith, are both earnestly
striving to fulfill all of their fiduciary duties to each of their individual
clients, and are both meticulous about complying with all potentially
applicable rules of legal ethics, including the aggregate settlement
rule.37
From the perspective of client welfare, the primary problem with
this variation in eventual gross settlement values is that a potential
client simply cannot know at the time she is choosing a firm to re-
present her whether Firm A, Firm B, or one of their competitors
would ultimately, several years later, be able to obtain the largest
gross settlement offer for her claim.38  Indeed, the law firms them-
37. Every state’s rules of legal ethics include an “aggregate settlement rule” that is based on
ABA Model Rule 1.8(g), which states:
A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggre-
gate settlement of the claims of or against the clients . . . unless each client gives in-
formed consent, in a writing signed by the client.  The lawyer’s disclosure shall include
the existence and nature of all the claims . . . involved and of the participation of each
person in the settlement.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2013).  For critical discussions of this rule’s costs
and benefits for clients in mass tort settlements, see Lynn A. Baker & Charles Silver, The Aggre-
gate Settlement Rule and Ideals of Client Service, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 227 (1999); Silver & Baker,
supra note 30; Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement
Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733 (1997).
38. This uncertainty may have yet another layer if the client’s claim is ultimately referred out
to another firm by the law firm that she originally retained to represent her.  The client’s consent
to such a referral will typically be required under the relevant state(s)’ ethics rules. See, e.g.,
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(e) (“A division of a fee between lawyers who
are not in the same firm may be made only if . . . the client agrees to the arrangement, including
the share each lawyer will receive, and the agreement is confirmed in writing . . . .”); TEX.
DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.04(f) (2005) (“A division or arrangement for
division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if . . . the client
consents in writing to the terms of the arrangement prior to the time of the association or refer-
ral proposed . . . .”).  The client, however, is unlikely to have any useful information for purposes
of that decision, beyond the information that her initial law firm apparently deems the referral to
be in her best interest, as well as their own. See Baker, supra note 12, at 443.
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selves would likely not know with certainty.39  Relatedly, if a client
were especially keen to receive her expected settlement funds sooner
rather than later—and were willing to accept, say, a 25% lower gross
settlement amount if she received the funds one year earlier—the cli-
ent similarly could not know which law firm, if any, would be most
likely to obtain the hoped-for minimum gross settlement offer value
within her preferred time frame.
In addition to these uncertainties regarding gross settlement offer
values, mass tort claimants currently do not have, and are not able to
get, useful information at the time they are choosing a law firm re-
garding the total expenses they will need to reimburse the firm in the
event of a financial recovery.  In addition to attorneys’ fees (about
which the client will have complete information at the time of choos-
ing a firm40), the other major variable that will affect a mass tort
claimant’s eventual net settlement value is reimbursable expenses.41
The contingent fee retainer agreement will necessarily set out the
kinds of expenses that will be advanced by the law firm on behalf of
the client and that the client will be obligated to repay in the event of
a recovery.42  But the eventual total dollar amount of those expenses
cannot be known by a potential client in advance and is likely to vary
across law firms.43  The only consolation for clients is that in a fair
number of cases the variation across law firms on this component may
39. The law firms might have a somewhat informed “gut feel” on this issue, however, based on
past experience.  And the firms would each know certain things, such as how well capitalized
they are, what their general risk preferences are, and whether they seem to be acquiring a large
inventory of relatively high quality claims—and those factors would be likely to affect the size of
the total settlement offer negotiated for the firm’s inventory of claims.  Even so, the firm would
not know many other potentially relevant factors with any certainty.
40. The contingent attorneys’ fee is obligated by state ethics rules to be disclosed with preci-
sion—at least with regard to the percentage fee, and whether the fee will be based on the gross
recovery or the net after reimbursable expenses are deducted. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c); TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.04(d).
41. Various health care-related insurance liens, including Medicare and Medicaid liens, may
also affect the client’s net settlement value. But those lien amounts will often not be affected by
the client’s choice of law firm. And many clients will not have any governmental (or other)
medical liens in any case.
42. These details and others are typically required by state ethics rules to be included in any
contingent fee retainer agreement. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c); TEX.
DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.04(d).
43. In some instances the variation across law firms regarding per-client reimbursable ex-
penses has been a matter of litigation, allegations of fraud, and even criminal prosecution. See,
e.g., Fleming v. Kinney ex rel. Shelton, 395 S.W.3d 917, 921 (Tex. App. 2013) (reversing on other
grounds a trial court decision that plaintiff’s attorney breached his fiduciary duty when he alleg-
edly deducted from settling clients’ fen-phen recoveries “a share of expenses attributable to
echocardiograms performed on thousands of other potential clients” whose cases were turned
down); Nick Brown, Ex-Lawyers Get 20, 25 Years In Fen-Phen Fraud Case, LAW360 (Aug. 17,
2009), http://www.law360.com/articles/116828/ex-lawyers-get-20-25-years-in-fen-phen-fraud-
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not be substantial, at least when compared to other factors affecting
their net settlement value—most notably the individual’s gross settle-
ment value.44
These sorts of uncertainties regarding gross and net claim values
and payment dates would be substantially mitigated if mass tort per-
sonal injury claimants had the option to sell their entire claim to an
attorney.  That option would enable a claimant to shop her claim
among various law firms and then to accept whatever offer she
deemed best, given her preferences regarding net settlement value,
timing of payments, risk, and anything else.  And if the claimant did
not consider any of the offers to buy her claim outright to be suffi-
ciently appealing, she would still have the opportunity to retain a law
firm on the traditional contingent fee basis with all of the attendant
uncertainties discussed above.
The availability of a claim-sale option may also, but would not nec-
essarily, result in larger net settlements for mass tort clients to the
extent that plaintiffs’ law firms handling such claims would have lower
operating costs than under the current regime.  In particular, these law
firms would likely realize savings in the current area of ongoing client
service, because they would no longer have as many clients in the
traditional sense with whom they would need to regularly communi-
cate in order to provide litigation updates, answer questions, and the
like.  It is possible, of course, that these firms instead would simply
case?article_related_content=1 (two attorneys convicted for “taking about $55 million more than
they were entitled to, in a massive settlement” related to the diet drug fen-phen).
44. In some cases, the variation across law firms might be very substantial.  The source of this
variation in most instances will not be “case specific” expenses, such as the costs of obtaining an
individual client’s medical and pharmacy records or the costs of filing a client’s case in court.  In
addition to being relatively fixed, the total amount of these sorts of costs incurred on behalf of
an individual client will also typically be relatively small.  Any significant variation in reimburs-
able expenses across firms is likely to be due to differences in the total amount of general or
group expenses, as well as the method of allocating those expenses.  For example, a firm that has
a case with an early trial date may incur substantial expenses during discovery and in the course
of otherwise preparing for that trial.  Many of those expenses may benefit the law firm’s entire
inventory and be properly shared among each of the firm’s Drug X clients as general or group
expenses.  Clients of a firm without such a trial date may have substantially lower, if any, gen-
eral/group expenses.
Relatedly, even clients of firms with comparable total group or general expenses to be allo-
cated across a similar number of clients may end up paying substantially different amounts de-
pending on whether the total group or general expenses are allocated equally (per capita) or
proportionally (pro rata) across the group of benefitted clients.  Either method of allocation is
permissible under current ethics rules. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 06-438 (2006).  Nonetheless, the effects of these different methods of allocating ex-
penses may result in substantial variation between law firms, especially with regard to clients
who ultimately receive especially high or especially low gross settlement offer amounts relative
to the other claimants in the relevant law firm’s inventory.
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end up shifting costs from ongoing client service to front-end claim
evaluation and claim purchasing, resulting in no net savings in the
firms’ operating costs to be passed through to their mass tort
claimants.
One of the most significant potential benefits to claimants of a
claim-sale option is that they would no longer need to seek out high-
interest advanced funding loans.  At present, a noteworthy number of
mass tort personal injury claimants take out such loans.45  The loans
often are for only a few thousand dollars, typically for no more than
10% of the estimated value of the claim, and the interest (or “financ-
ing fee”) accrues at a significant monthly rate.46  The loans are typi-
cally nonrecourse, however, which means that the debtor-claimant
owes nothing if she receives no compensation for her claim and that
the amount ultimately to be repaid will not in any event exceed the
eventual recovery.47  If the debtor-claimant obtains a financial recov-
ery for her claims, the loaned funds must be repaid along with the
specified financing fees, which are commonly 3%–5% per month from
the time of loan origination.48
Some mass tort claimants may take out such a loan to pay their rent
and otherwise scrape by while awaiting the resolution of their claims.
Others may do so to ensure that they receive at least some money for
their claim, whether because they are extremely risk averse or because
they fear their claim is weak and may result in no eventual recovery.49
Given the high effective interest rates typically charged for such loans,
one would expect that most recipients have exhausted, or do not qual-
ify for, less costly sources of financing, such as consumer bank loans or
45. As of early 2010, at least twenty-nine companies offered consumer legal funding to U.S.
plaintiffs. GARBER, supra note 10, at 10–11.
46. See id. at 12 (noting that “two industry leaders estimate the average sizes of their cash
advances to be $1,750 and $4,500, and that advances average less than 10 percent of conserva-
tively estimated values of the underlying legal claims,” and further noting that “monthly fees of 2
to 4 percent are fairly common”); see also Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market
Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65, 93 (2010) (noting that firms that offer cash
advances to personal injury victims charge “very high interest rates . . . typically 3% to 5%
monthly interest, and often much higher”); George Steven Swan, Economics and the Litigation
Funding Industry: How Much Justice Can You Afford?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 805, 824 (2001)
(reporting that most funders “advance a maximum of $20,000 to individual plaintiffs”).
47. GARBER, supra note 10, at 9–10.
48. Molot, supra note 46, at 93.
49. Of course, the financing company would be unlikely to make a loan to a claimant with a
weak case.  Thus, the willingness of the financing company to make a loan should signal to a
rational claimant that the claim does have merit and is likely to result in a recovery at least 90%
greater than the amount that the company is willing to loan the claimant.  Even with this infor-
mation, however, a claimant may be sufficiently risk averse that she prefers the relatively small
loan with its high effective interest rate to “taking her chances” and waiting for a potentially
much greater settlement unburdened by finance charges.
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credit cards.50  In some instances, however, clients who do have other,
potentially less costly options may be attracted to this type of funding
because their eventual repayment obligation is capped by the size of
the future recovery, if any.
Many legal scholars and bar association committees have expressed
concerns about various aspects of these loans, including ethical and
practical issues that may arise for the attorneys of clients who seek
such funding.51  In the mass tort context, one significant issue arises at
the time the claimant who has obtained an “advanced funding” loan
receives a settlement offer.  Depending on the size of the loan, the
effective interest rate, and how much time has passed since the claim-
ant received the loan, the claimant’s entire settlement proceeds may
be destined for the loan company.52  In that event, the claimant may
have no incentive to accept the settlement offer.53  A decision by the
claimant to decline the settlement offer has special import in the mass
tort context, however, beyond depriving the claimant’s law firm of its
fee and reimbursement of its expenses.  It may also make it more diffi-
cult for the claimant’s law firm to meet any participation threshold
specified in the group settlement agreement, thereby putting at risk
50. The effective interest rates charged for these loans commonly exceed even the very high
interest assessed on certain credit card balances. See, e.g., Rancman v. Interim Settlement Fund-
ing Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 219 (Ohio 2003) (discussing lower court’s holding that the contingent
advances on settlements were illegal loans because the potential profit exceeded the legally al-
lowable interest rate); Molot, supra note 46, at 94 (“[B]ecause the risk associated with litigation
is higher than that of nonpayment for conventional loans, cash advance firms charge high rates
of interest.  Indeed, the rates are so high that, in many instances, they might violate usury laws
were they subject to those laws.” (footnote omitted)).
51. See, e.g., ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 15–39; BEISNER ET AL., supra note 2, at 7–8;
Douglas R. Richmond, Other People’s Money: The Ethics of Litigation Funding, 56 MERCER L.
REV. 649, 669–81 (2005); Yifat Shaltiel & John Cofresi, Litigation Lending for Personal Needs
Act: A Regulatory Framework to Legitimatize Third Party Litigation Finance, 58 CONSUMER FIN.
L. Q. REP. 347, 350–51 (2004); Steinitz, supra note 1, 1318–25 (2011); Courtney R. Barksdale,
Note, All That Glitters Isn’t Gold: Analyzing the Costs and Benefits of Litigation Finance, 26
REV. LITIG. 707, 725–33 (2007); Andrew Hananel & David Staubitz, Current Development, The
Ethics of Law Loans in the Post-Rancman Era, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 795, 804–12 (2004).
52. The claimant’s settlement proceeds here are exclusive of the claimant’s contractual attor-
neys’ fees, reimbursable litigation expenses, and any governmental or private medical liens.
53. It is useful to contrast the incentives of the mass tort claimant with an advance funding
loan with those of an ordinary personal injury claimant with such a loan.  The latter claimant,
who likely will have more control over the timing of settlement negotiations than any mass tort
claimant, might be expected to “rush” to settle and to accept an offer that is potentially too low
in order to stop the clock on the continued accrual of high interest.  This is more than a little bit
perverse, since one obvious function that the advance funding loans might serve is to level the
playing field a bit between defendant and plaintiff, and to enable the claimant potentially to hold
out for a better offer. See, e.g., JONATHAN T. MOLOT, BURFORD CAPITAL LLC, THEORY AND
PRACTICE IN LITIGATION RISK 2–4 (2013), available at http://www.burfordcapital.com/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2013/08/Booklet-Theory-and-Practice.pdf; Molot, supra note 46, at 93–95.
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the settlement offers to the other claimants covered by the
agreement.54
The availability of a claim-sale option would enable a claimant to
receive her entire net settlement promptly, and would particularly
benefit the subgroup of claimants that currently seeks advance fund-
ing loans to make ends meet while awaiting their settlement offer.
Those clients would no longer effectively be spending a substantial
portion of their eventual settlement on interest and financing fees.  Of
course, some law firms engaged in buying claims may themselves be
taking out loans to finance that enterprise, and passing their own fi-
nancing costs on to those whose claims they purchase.  One would
expect the law firm, however, to be able to borrow at a substantially
lower interest rate than the effective interest rate of the typical claim-
ant’s advance funding loan, resulting in a net savings to the claimant
relative to the current state of affairs.
A related benefit is that claimants will have more and better infor-
mation about the present value of their claim.  Currently, clients are
able to receive some information from their attorneys regarding the
potential value of their claims, and one would expect most attorneys
to be cautious and conservative in the assessments they provide.  At
the same time, however, clients may be reading news reports of vastly
larger verdicts in trials involving the same drug that is the basis for
their own claims, while reports of the trials in which the defendant
prevailed and the claimant received nothing are often less visible.55
54. See, e.g., Vioxx Settlement Agreement, supra note 35, § 11.1, at 41–42 (providing that
defendant Merck had the option to terminate the settlement agreement if fewer than a specified
number of potential claimants did not enroll in the settlement program).
55. The public’s understanding of the American civil justice system is especially poor with
regard to jury verdicts, in part due to the inevitable biases in news reporting.  A $253 million
verdict in a case will make the front page of the New York Times. See, e.g., Alex Berenson, Jury
Calls Merck Liable in Death of Man on Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2005, at A1 [hereinafter
Berenson, Jury]; see also Alex Berenson, A Lawyer’s Stock Rises With Victory Over Merck, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 22, 2005, at C1, while a take-nothing judgment for the defendant pharmaceutical
company will receive little, if any, press coverage, and is almost never front-page news. See Lynn
A. Baker & Charles Silver, Introduction: Civil Justice Fact and Fiction, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1537,
1540 (2002) (noting that “[l]arge jury awards receive more coverage than small awards and de-
fense verdicts, even though the latter are far more common”); see also Daniel S. Bailis & Robert
J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with the Media as Your Guide: A Content Analysis of
Media Coverage of Tort Litigation, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 419 (1996).
In addition, a substantial portion of the public may not know or understand that a $253 million
verdict does not mean that the plaintiff walked out of the courthouse with a check for that
amount. (Even though the news report, as in the case of Lanier’s Vioxx verdict, may well report
that fact along with others aimed at explaining what, really, the verdict likely means for the
plaintiff, many who read the report could be expected to remember the headline and not those
much less interesting, “legalistic” details.)  In fact, the prevailing plaintiff may need to wait sev-
eral years while such a verdict is appealed, perhaps twice, to know whether she will receive
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Such asymmetrical information, combined with the well-documented
human tendency to consider one’s self “above average” in comparison
to one’s peers regardless of the reality,56 is likely to cause claimants in
the current regime to have inflated expectations regarding their even-
tual settlement offer amounts.
Such unrealistic expectations regarding the value of one’s claim will
be more difficult to maintain in a world with a claim-sale option.
Many claimants could be expected to sell their claim for the going
rate, rendering moot the entire issue of expectations.  And individuals
who choose not to sell their claim and instead hire an attorney on a
contingent fee basis to pursue the possibility of a larger net settlement
offer would be doing so with a more accurate baseline of information
regarding the likely value of their claim.  The information generated
by the claim-sale market should cause even these clients to be less
disappointed in, and therefore more likely to accept, their eventual
settlement offer.  Further, while awaiting their settlement offer, these
clients may be less likely to embark on financially damaging, overly
optimistic shopping sprees spurred by unrealistic expectations regard-
ing the size of their eventual settlement offer.57
Another benefit of a claim-sale option is that mass tort claimants
will not have unrealistic expectations about having their “day in
court.” When selling her claim to an attorney, the claimant will neces-
sarily confront the fact that she will be receiving compensation for her
claims, but will not have an opportunity to tell her story to a jury.  At
present, only a very tiny number of mass tort cases are ever tried,
which means that claimants, with rare exception, have no reason to
anything at all for claims.  And in at least some cases, the successful trial plaintiff may receive
nothing after the appeals process is completed. See, e.g., Alex Berenson, Courts Reject Two
Major Vioxx Verdicts, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2008, at C2 (discussing decision of Texas state ap-
peals court that reversed the $253 million Vioxx verdict (which had already been reduced to $26
million by a state law on punitive damages)).
56. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average:
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439
(1993) (empirical study of representativeness heuristic causing newlyweds to grossly underesti-
mate the likelihood that their marriage might end in divorce).
57. Such shopping sprees sometimes cause mass tort claimants to throw additional good
money after bad by suing their attorney for malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty. See, e.g.,
Jacobs v. Tapscott, 516 F. Supp. 2d 639 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (breach of fiduciary duty lawsuit
brought unsuccessfully against plaintiffs’ law firm by family members of deceased asbestos
claimant after settlement for $2.5 million was obtained for them by the law firm), aff’d, 277 Fed.
App’x 483 (5th Cir. 2008).  Not having received the settlement offer amount they were hoping
for, and having already spent the hoped-for settlement funds, some disappointed claimants de-
cide that their attorney did not represent them sufficiently well or that the attorney at some
point lied to or misled them about the expected value of their claim.  These claimants may then
hire an attorney on an hourly rate basis to sue their mass tort attorney.
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expect that they will have their day in court.  But it is not clear how
many claimants understand this when they retain an attorney to pur-
sue their claims.58  One might expect a claimant who cared at least as
much about having a day in court as about any potential compensa-
tion to inquire about the likelihood of, and anticipated time frame for,
a trial when choosing an attorney to pursue her claims.  If most claim-
ants (incorrectly) expect that their claims will eventually be tried,
however, they may not feel it necessary to ask these questions.
There is a dearth of systematic empirical data on mass tort claim-
ants’ expectations and preferences regarding their day in court.59  The
little data that exist suggest that the nature and context of the claim
may significantly affect a claimant’s preferences in this area.  Individu-
als with property damage claims, such as those arising out of the 2010
BP oil spill, might be expected to care primarily, even exclusively,
about receiving fair financial compensation as expeditiously as possi-
ble.  A day in court is unlikely to be of independent interest to such
claimants, not least because the costs of a successful trial will ulti-
mately be borne by the claimant.60
At the other end of the preference continuum might be individuals
pursuing certain wrongful death claims on behalf of a deceased family
member.  As Gillian Hadfield’s study of such claimants after the 9/11
tragedy revealed,61 many claimants accepted settlements through the
9/11 Fund administered by Ken Feinberg, either because they “wanted
58. Mass tort retainer agreements typically include a wide range of details about the attorney-
client relationship and the anticipated handling of the client’s claim, most of which are required
by state ethics rules to be included. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c)
(2013); TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.04(d) (2005).  But the retainer
agreements do not, in my experience, typically include any discussion of the likelihood that a
client’s case will be tried.
59. An especially noteworthy and valuable exception is Gillian Hadfield’s empirical study of
claimants in the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice
Between Cash and the Courthouse: Experiences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 645 (2008).
60. Even when represented on a contingent fee basis, a claimant will be responsible in the
event of a recovery for reimbursing the litigation costs advanced by her attorney. Indeed, attor-
neys are currently prohibited by the ethics rules of every state from entering into any arrange-
ment with a client that does not require the reimbursement of litigation costs from an eventual
recovery. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (prohibiting an attorney from
“provid[ing] financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litiga-
tion, except that . . . a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment
of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter”); TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.08(d) (same but also permitting attorneys to make contingent advances of
“reasonably necessary medical and living expenses”).  If a case is tried to a jury, these costs can
be substantial and will commonly exceed $150,000 in cases involving any scientific or medical
expertise.
61. Hadfield, supra note 59, at 665–66.
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to put the matter behind them” or because pressing financial needs
resulting from the loss of the family breadwinner left them no alterna-
tive.62  But many of those who settled reported feeling “‘discomfort,
regret, shame, anger’—about not filing suits, which might have pro-
vided more information, accountability, and change.”63  Indeed, some
of those who chose to file suit rather than accept compensation from
the 9/11 Fund asserted that “the fear of losing in court was not a
worry.”64  According to one claimant who lost her husband, “[i]t was
never a risk to me because it was never about getting more
money . . . .  I wanted to know why and how this happened in this
country . . . .  If suing for money is how I have to do it then that’s what
I’m going to do.”65
In between these two groups is likely the bulk of mass tort personal
injury claimants.  These individuals can be expected to need and want
the financial compensation they believe they are owed for their inju-
ries.  Although the more personal and intimate nature of their injuries
may cause them to be somewhat more interested than property dam-
age claimants in having an opportunity in court to formally express
their outrage against the defendant, one would still expect their pri-
mary focus to be on maximizing their net financial recovery.  Because
they are pursuing their own claim and not a claim on behalf of a de-
ceased family member, they are not likely to feel that they are letting
anyone else down if they take the money and forego the expensive
option of using the litigation system to tell their story, uncover the
truth, hold the defendant accountable, or effect larger social change.
Perhaps the most intriguing evidence in support of this view is the
content of “spam” email advertisements soliciting mass tort personal
injury claimants.  During the two-month period of February 3, 2013 to
April 4, 2013, I received forty-two such emails concerning potential
personal injury claims resulting from a variety of pharmaceuticals and
legal devices: Zoloft®, Paxil®, Depakote®, Effexor®, Prozac®,
Topamax®, Celexa®, Lexapro®, GranuFlo® and NaturaLyte® dialy-
sis devices, and mesh implants.  Every one of these emails includes,
and typically leads off with, some variant of “compensation available,”
“you may be entitled to compensation for your injuries!,” “settle-
62. Benjamin Weiser, Value of Suing Over 9/11 Deaths Is Still Unsettled, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13,
2009, at A20.
63. Id.; see also Hadfield, supra note 59, at 670–73.
64. Weiser, supra note 62.
65. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Even this claimant ultimately settled, although
outside the Fund.  “But she said that the legal process became oppressive, and Ms. Roth, who
has remarried, settled her lawsuit two years ago.  ‘I moved forward,’ she said, confident that
others would ‘see this through to the end to get the answers we all deserve.’” Id.
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ments,” or “big settlements.”66  None of the emails made any refer-
ence to having one’s day in court, pursuing one’s claim in the courts,
or litigating one’s claim.67  It is possible, of course, that the advertise-
ments do not mention having one’s day in court because the law firms
involved know that few, if any clients, will receive one (and that trials
are rarely cost effective for the median mass tort personal injury
claimant in any case).  Still, the direct and exclusive focus on compen-
sation and settlements in these solicitations suggests that their authors
believe that offers of money alone are attractive to a significant por-
tion of the target groups.
It is a small step from law firm advertisements stating that “com-
pensation” and “settlements” may be available for certain claims to
law firm advertisements stating that “we buy claims” involving those
same pharmaceuticals and medical devices.  And the analysis above
suggests that most potential claimants would view favorably the even
more direct focus on compensation in solicitations that would be pos-
sible if a claim-sale option were available.  The subset of claimants still
interested in pursuing justice through litigation would continue to
have that option.  But even they might benefit from the availability of
a claim-sale option that increased the amount of accurate information
available to claimants about the small likelihood and substantial ex-
pense of having the desired day in court.
A final potential benefit of a claim-sale option is that more claim-
ants with meritorious claims would receive compensation.  At present,
there are undoubtedly some individuals who do not pursue their
claims for any of a number of plausible reasons: they may generally
dislike or distrust lawyers; they may not understand that they can ob-
tain contingent fee representation at no out-of-pocket cost; they may
believe that they must be involved in a trial to receive any compensa-
tion and do not want to become entangled in “the legal system”; they
66. These emails are on file with the author.  One email, received on January 14, 2013, led off
with the enticing “Woman received $5 Million Settlement and Husband is awarded $500,000 in
mesh recall case!”  The email went on to ask:  “Do you have a mesh implant used to treat Pelvic
Organ Prolapse (POP) or Stress Urinary Incontinence (SUI)?” and noted that “You may be
entitled to substantial financial compensation!”  No further details were provided about the $5
Million settlement. See E-mail from Mesh Injury Comp. Ctr. to author (Jan. 14, 2013) (on file
with author).
67. Some emails, however, did include the warning: “DON’T DELAY! THERE IS A LIM-
ITED TIME TO FILE YOUR CLAIM!” See, e.g., E-mail from ZoloftLawsuit to author (Dec.
4, 2012) (on file with author); E-mail from Mesh Injury Legal Ctr. to author (Dec. 14, 2012); E-
mail from Mesh Injury Comp. Ctr. to author (Jan. 13, 2013) (on file with author); E-mail from
Mesh Patch Recall Ctr. to author (Apr. 23, 2013); E-mail from Dialysis Injury Legal Ctr. to
author (May 30, 2013) (on file with author); E-mail from Mirena Legal Injury Connect to author
(June 17, 2013) (on file with author).
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may think that in order to pursue their claims they must sue or
“blame” their personal physician and do not want to do so; they may
believe that “the legal system” is biased against individuals of their
race, gender, ethnicity, religion, or social class and that they especially
have no chance to prevail against a major corporation; or they may
not be comfortable with the idea of suing anyone or any entity, includ-
ing a corporation.68
In sum, there may currently be many individuals with meritorious
mass tort personal  injury claims who are entirely comfortable with
the idea of receiving compensation for their injuries but who very
much do not want to have their “day in court” or to otherwise be
involved with a lawsuit or lawyers.69  A claim-sale option would make
it vastly more attractive for these individuals to seek fair compensa-
tion for their claims, thereby ensuring that that the maximum number
of individuals with meritorious claims receive compensation.
B. Costs to Mass Tort Claimants of Lifting the Prohibitions on
Complete Alienation
As set out above, there are many expected benefits to mass tort
claimants of having the option to sell their entire claim to an attorney
in addition to the current option of granting the attorney a substantial
contingent fee interest in their claim.  This subpart examines the ex-
pected, albeit few, costs to claimants of providing that option.
68. One major plaintiffs’ firm states the following on its website: “Many times we’ve heard
from our clients ‘I’m not the type to file a lawsuit,’ until they realize the full extent of the dam-
age that the drug companies have caused.” See Why a Pharmaceutical Attorney?, BLIZZARD &
NABERS, http://www.blizzardlaw.com/why-pharmaceutical-attorney (last visited Mar. 17, 2014).
This reluctance to sue may be especially prevalent among women and certain racial or cultural
groups. See, e.g., Michele Hoyman & Lamont Stallworth, Suit Filing by Women: An Empirical
Analysis, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 61, 81–82 (1986) (empirical study of 876 union members
employed by the same public sector employer, which found that, with regard to employment
discrimination claims, “blacks are exercising their rights (or at least they are filing at a greater
rate than whites) but women are not”); see also David Marcus, Some Realism About Mass Torts,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1949, 1984–85 (2008) (book review) (“Whether the reason be conflict avoid-
ance, indifference, or something else, most people eschew litigation even when they have poten-
tially valuable claims.”).
69. Some of these individuals may be analogous to those who are keen to buy a new car, but
are mortified at the prospect of having to bargain with a salesperson in order to do so. The
Saturn corporation, a self-described “new kind of car company,” arose in 1990 and its innovative
“no haggle” pricing was specifically designed to satisfy the sector of the automobile market un-
comfortable with conflict or “haggling.” See WILLIARD N. ANDER & NEIL Z. STERN, WINNING
AT RETAIL: DEVELOPING A SUSTAINED MODEL FOR RETAIL SUCCESS 116–19 (2010); see also
Peter Valdes-Dapena, Saturn: Secrets of the ‘No-Haggle’ Price, CNN MONEY (Sept. 9, 2006),
http://money.cnn.com/2006/09/19/autos/debating_no-haggle/ (noting that “[f]ew people actually
like the process of haggling for the best price on a new car,” and “almost two-thirds of car
shoppers in a recent survey said they would prefer to pay a single, set price”).
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The availability of a claim-sale option would simply provide mass
tort personal injury claimants expanded choice when deciding
whether and how to proceed with a potential claim.  Claimants would
still have the opportunity to retain an attorney on the traditional con-
tingent fee basis and to litigate their claim in the tort system.  A claim-
ant keen to have her day in court would still be able to pursue that
option and, as explained in the previous subpart, would likely have
more complete information about the likelihood and potential finan-
cial and other costs of trying her claim to a jury.
The only significant concern for claimants under such a regime
would be felt by some claimants who chose to retain an attorney on
the traditional contingent fee basis.  If they were represented by an
attorney whose inventory of claims also included claims that the attor-
ney had purchased outright, and in which the attorney therefore had a
100% interest rather than a 40% interest, the contingent fee claimants
might fear that the attorney’s allocation of any eventual settlement
fund would be biased in favor of the claims that the attorney owned in
their entirety.70  It is possible that such a situation might never arise,
however, because it may violate state equivalents of current ABA
Model Rule 1.7, which prohibits an attorney from representing a cli-
ent if “there is a significant risk that the representation . . . will be
materially limited by the . . . personal interest of the lawyer.”71  A
first-blush solution to this potential conflict and related claimant con-
cerns, is to limit law firms to being either claim-purchase firms or con-
tingent fee firms with regard to a particular mass tort.
70. At present, a firm’s “ownership interest” in its inventory is often “mixed” in a slightly less
extreme way.  For example, a firm may have a 40% fee interest in some cases but may only have
a 20% fee interest in cases that it received on referral from another law firm and with which it
has agreed to share fees.  To date, the only significant remedy mandated for such situations has
been that set out in ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 06-438 (2006),
which specified that disclosure of the various fee interests be made to all of the clients covered
by the settlement agreement as a further elaboration of the disclosures currently required under
ABA Model Rule 1.8(g) regulating “aggregate settlements.”
71. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2013); see also, e.g., TEX. DISCIPLINARY
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.06(b)(2) (2005).  For purposes of my larger argument, I am
assuring that state equivalents of other ABA Model Rules that my proposal would seem to
violate, such as current Model Rule 1.8(i), which prohibits a lawyer from “acquir[ing] a proprie-
tary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a
client,” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(i), would be amended as appropriate to
permit the proposal.
2014] ALIENABILITY OF MASS TORT CLAIMS 293
C. Benefits to Mass Tort Attorneys of Lifting the Prohibitions on
Complete Alienation
If attorneys had the option to purchase an individual’s mass tort
personal injury claim in its entirety rather than contract to represent
that person for a contingent fee interest in the claim, they would po-
tentially realize numerous benefits.  First, they would no longer need
to fear unpredictable cuts to their contractual contingent fees imposed
by courts as the larger litigation nears its end.  Such ex post fee cuts
are ordered with increasing frequency, particularly by federal MDL
judges.72  Among the many problems with such cuts is the uncertainty
they create for plaintiffs’ lawyers regarding their eventual fees and
therefore the “correct” amount to invest in any given case or litiga-
tion.  The likely result is that, over time, plaintiffs’ lawyers will invest
less in a new litigation, to the potential disadvantage of the relevant
clients, in order to protect against the possibility that a court will later
cut their contractual fees.
To be sure, a claim-sale option will not eliminate all uncertainty re-
garding the “correct” amount for an attorney to invest in a litigation.
As under the current regime of contingent fees, attorneys who
purchase claims will be left to negotiate a price for the release of those
claims to the defendant, and that price will not be known in advance.
A claim-sale option simply limits the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ uncertainty
to the settlement amount, while eliminating the additional uncertainty
presented by the possibility of a court-ordered fee cut.  The result is
less total uncertainty for the plaintiffs’ lawyer and therefore a greater
opportunity to invest the “correct” amount in any given litigation.
A second potential benefit to attorneys of a claim-purchase option
is that their eventual settlement negotiations with the defendant may
yield a finality “premium” that is not available under the current re-
gime due to various ethical restrictions.73  An attorney who owns the
72. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. La. 2009) (affirming cap
on plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees at 32%); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods.
Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) (capping
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees at 20%, but giving attorneys the ability to petition for increasing cap to
33.33% if justified); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
(capping plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees at 35%, adjustable to a minimum of 30% and a maximum of
37.5%).  Judges in product liability MDL cases are not alone in their interest in sua sponte
regulation of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees. See Lynn A. Baker et al., Setting Attorneys’ Fees in Se-
curities Class Actions: An Empirical Assessment, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1677, 1682 (2013) (docu-
menting sua sponte judicial cuts of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees in nearly 20% of cases brought
under the PSLRA).
73. These ethical restrictions include the aggregate settlement rule, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.8(g), as well as limitations on the lawyer’s ability to practice law (in terms of both
withdrawal from current cases and declining new cases going forward). Id. R. 5.6(b).  For discus-
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entire claim (and group of claims) will be able to assure the defendant
that the settlement is final; there will be no need to present individual
settlement offers to clients and seek their consent to the settlement.74
There will be no instances of an individual client within a law firm’s
larger inventory declining to settle, holding out for a larger settlement
offer, or insisting that the attorney take the case to trial—all of which
are current possibilities that adversely affect the finality that the de-
fendant prizes.  A defendant is likely to pay more for the greater final-
ity available under a claim-sale option.  This in turn means that the
entire plaintiff-side market for such claims will be better than under
the current regime, redounding also to the benefit of the injured per-
son who sells her claim to an attorney.75
Relatedly, the absence of a traditional client or attorney-client rela-
tionship means that attorneys need not worry about potential ethical
violations or claims by clients that they have engaged in malpractice
or have breached a fiduciary duty.76  This should reduce the cost of (or
need for) malpractice insurance, thereby reducing the plaintiffs’ attor-
ney’s operating costs.  (And one would expect some portion of this
reduction in the attorneys’ costs to be passed on to the injured person
in the form of a (marginally) higher offer to purchase her claim.)
Finally, the availability of a claim-sale option would enable attor-
neys to solve a costly problem that they currently confront in certain
situations.77  Consider a hypothetical asbestos claimant who hired an
attorney fifteen years ago who has been diligently pursuing defend-
sion of the “finality premium” in mass tort litigation, see, for example, Silver & Baker, supra
note 37, at 760–63; Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 265, 318–20 (2011); Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill
Settlement and the Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 412–18 (2014).
74. The aggregate settlement rule in every state requires that the settling clients give “in-
formed consent, in a writing signed by the client” after disclosure by the plaintiff’s lawyer of “the
existence and nature of all the claims . . . involved and of the participation of each person in the
settlement.” See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g).
75. See Silver & Baker, supra note 37, at 760–63; see also Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 73,
at 270–71; Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 73, at 412–18.
76. The ethical concerns affect defense counsel as well as plaintiffs’ counsel. See, e.g., MODEL
CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (“A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making . . . an
agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is part of the settlement of a
client controversy” (emphasis added)); id. R. 8.4 (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to
. . . violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional conduct, knowingly assist or induce
another to do so, or do so through the acts of another . . . .”).  In the mass tort context, however,
it is the plaintiffs’ attorneys who historically have incurred the more significant and potentially
costly burdens of any potential violation. See Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 240 (Tex. 1999)
(holding that “a client need not prove actual damages in order to obtain forfeiture of an attor-
ney’s fee for the attorney’s breach of fiduciary duty to the client”).
77. In addition to the asbestos example explored at length below, there are analogous situa-
tions involving residual defendants in pharmaceutical and other mass tort cases.
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ants and obtaining settlements on the client’s behalf.  At present, the
claimant may have settled with the vast majority of defendants against
which he has a viable claim, but may still have valid claims pending
against, for instance, six additional defendants, all of whom are cur-
rently in bankruptcy.  At various (and unpredictable) points in the fu-
ture, the bankruptcy process may yield a relatively small settlement
offer for the client from a given defendant.  In some situations, the
cost to the law firm of keeping the client’s file open, as well as the
processing costs of handling the paperwork and funds involved with
the series of small settlements, may make the handling of such claims
no longer cost effective for the law firm.  The claimant also suffers
because he ultimately bears the postage and other non-overhead costs
that attend the settlement process, as well as the uncertainty of the
timing and expected net amount of such settlements.
Under a claim-sale option, the law firm could simply purchase out-
right the client’s residual claims against the defendants in bank-
ruptcy.78  The client would receive her remaining settlement funds
promptly in a lump sum, and the law firm would be able to close the
client’s file.  If all of the firm’s asbestos clients sold their residual
claims in this way, the firm would save all of the overhead and other
costs that currently attend these open files and future small settlement
offers.  In effect, the firm would end up with a single client—itself—in
future dealings with the bankrupt defendants regarding the firm’s in-
ventory of claims, with all of the attendant savings of transaction and
other costs.79
78. Because the firm currently has a fiduciary relationship with the relevant clients, and the
purchase by the firm of the clients claims would necessarily be a business transaction between
the firm and the client, the firm would need to take various precautions mandated by state ethics
rules, such as advising the clients to consult another attorney in deciding whether or not to
accept the offer, ensuring that the price being offered for the claim is reasonable, and so on. See,
e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a); TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CON-
DUCT R. 1.08(a) (2005).
79. It is important to note that in the bankruptcy context the trial of a claimant’s case is not an
option.  At the moment that the debtor files its bankruptcy petition, all actions and proceedings
against the debtor are automatically stayed.  11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006); see also Troy A. McKen-
zie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 1004
& n.165 (2012) (noting that the stay prevents the continued prosecution of a tort case against the
debtor, and that none of the Bankruptcy Code’s enumerated exceptions to the automatic stay
are generally applicable in the mass tort context).  Thus, any concerns about a claim-sale option’s
effects on the credibility of the claim purchaser’s threat to take the case to trial are moot. See
infra Part II.D.
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D. Costs and Concerns for Mass Tort Attorneys of Lifting the
Prohibitions on Complete Alienation
For mass tort attorneys, the availability of a claim-sale option may
raise some concerns to go along with the various benefits discussed
above.  First, some sort of claim “registry” would need to be estab-
lished to ensure that clients do not sell their cause of action to more
than one law firm.  Even under the current regime, a plaintiffs’ attor-
ney often learns when formalizing a group settlement with a defen-
dant that some of the clients whom the attorney thought his firm
represented had also retained another, unrelated firm.80  Such double-
retention instances are problematic under the current regime81 and
would be even more costly to attorneys under a claim-sale option.
Given modern technology, a central claim registry (presumably based
on Social Security numbers and available for both state and federal
claims) should be relatively inexpensive to establish and maintain
under the supervision of the federal judiciary, and would benefit both
the claimants and law firms involved in claim sales.
Similarly, law firms interested in buying claims will need to under-
take a higher level of due diligence than the standard contingent fee
attorneys to ensure that the injured person seeking to sell a claim is
the owner of the claim.  In addition to checking the claim registry for
notice of a prior sale, a firm contemplating a claim purchase will also
want to confirm that the injured person is not currently (and has not
previously been) involved in a bankruptcy proceeding that would
make the claim part of the bankruptcy estate.  If the bankruptcy es-
tate, and not the injured person, currently “owns” the claim, the in-
jured person has no claim to sell to a potential purchaser.  Such due
diligence regarding bankruptcies—which typically involves only a
check of the online PACER database of bankruptcy filings—is a cost
80. The issue here should not be confused with a pre-agreed referral or fee-sharing situation
which is typically initiated by the attorney with whom the client originally signs a contract.
Rather, the issue is when the client simply signs retainer agreements with more than one law
firm without any of the firms knowing that it is not the only firm that the client has retained in
the matter.  Because many mass tort cases are not filed prior to settlement, attorneys typically
have no way to know about the double-retention until the defendant brings it to their attention
when consummating a group settlement.  Some plaintiffs’ firms do include language in their
retainer agreement in which the client affirms that she has not retained other counsel to pursue
the same claim, but this language alone provides little deterrence in practice, whether due to
client ignorance or intended cleverness.
81. Under the current, contingent fee regime, attorneys from all of the relevant firms must
spend time determining (usually in consultation with the client) which firm (or firms) is or will
be representing the client going forward; and the defendant typically will not finalize the rele-
vant firm(s)’ larger inventory settlement(s) until these issues are resolved, sometimes after sig-
nificant delay.
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that firms currently bear, but typically not until the defendant has
made a settlement offer, and the plaintiffs’ attorneys must obtain a
signed release from whoever owns the injured person’s claim.  Thus,
the availability of a claim-sale option will primarily alter the timing of
this due diligence and will not significantly increase the costs to the
law firm purchasing the claim.82
A second category of concern that mass tort attorneys might be ex-
pected to have about a claim-sale option is ensuring the participation
of the injured person in any future legal proceedings.  One might ex-
pect an injured person who has sold her entire claim to be unwilling to
participate in the legal process with regard to that claim since she no
longer has any financial interest in it.  As other scholars have observed
in the context of individual claims, this issue could potentially be han-
dled through a contract between the injured person and the purchas-
ing firm which obligates the injured person to participate as needed in
any eventual legal proceedings.83  In the alternative, the purchasing
firm could withhold a portion of the monies due the injured person
until she has fulfilled any participatory obligations or it is clear that
there will not be any.84  In the mass tort context, the problem is even
less likely to arise, and when it does, these solutions should be no less
effective.85  As discussed above, only a minute percentage of cases in
any mass tort will proceed through trial, and the selection of cases for
trial is largely a matter regulated by the MDL court, with the joint
cooperation of defense counsel and the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee
(or its analogue).
A third concern for mass tort attorneys would be the effect of a
claim-sale option on a defendant’s willingness to resolve claims
through settlement.  To the extent that a claim-sale option reduces the
credibility of a plaintiff’s attorney’s threat to take the defendant to
trial, the defendant might be correspondingly reluctant to settle that
attorney’s inventory of claims (or be interested in settling only at sub-
stantially reduced claim values).  As explained above, however, a
82. Of course, the claim-sale option will result in many more such bankruptcy checks being
conducted.  Under the current regime, the bankruptcy status of a claim for which no settlement
offer is received from the defendant typically is not researched.
83. See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 3, at 751–52; Shukaitis, supra note 18, at 340 (noting that
“such cooperation clauses are routinely found in standard insurance contracts, which raise the
mirror problem with the defense of claims”).
84. See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 3, at 751–52; Shukaitis, supra note 18, at 340–41.
85. In addition, the experience in (and outside) the mass tort world with successfully trying
wrongful death claims might suggest that it is entirely possible—if perhaps not preferable—to
pursue claims on behalf of an absent party.  The $253 million Vioxx verdict obtained by Mark
Lanier in 2005 in a case involving a man who died in 2001 is perhaps the best known example.
See supra note 54.
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claim-sale option need not adversely affect—nor even change—the
likelihood that a claim will be tried.  In addition, many factors besides
the threat of trial (or of a possible plaintiff’s verdict) affect a defen-
dant’s interest in resolving claims through settlement.  As long as mass
tort claims are pending against a corporate defendant, its share price
will likely be suppressed.  Clearing the liability from the company’s
ledger is the best way to remove the cloud over its stock.86  Histori-
cally, mass tort defendants have ultimately been willing to resolve
pending claims via group settlements even while publicly professing
that they “will never settle” and “will try every case,”87 and even when
the litigation to date has yielded no plaintiff victories and no reasona-
ble expectation of any in the future.88
A final issue for plaintiffs’ lawyers would be the out-of-pocket cost
of buying entire claims.  The current contingent fee regime requires a
law firm to advance the costs of prosecuting a client’s claim, as well as
its human capital and the opportunity costs of its employees’ and
shareholders’ time.  But the actual cash outlay per claim is substan-
tially less than would be required to purchase a client’s claim.  In addi-
tion, the contingent fee regime enables the firm to share with the mass
tort client the various risks regarding the eventual value of the client’s
claim, including whether the larger litigation, including the underlying
science critical to establishing legal causation, will proceed in a direc-
tion favorable to the plaintiffs.  At present, neither the firm nor the
client is “paid,” if at all, until the claim is resolved with the defendant
via settlement or trial.  Purchasing an entire claim necessarily shifts all
86. To take just one recent, notable example: The concern with the company’s stock price, as
well as with its larger relationship with U.S. governmental regulators, likely explains in signifi-
cant part BP’s eagerness to admit liability and establish the Gulf Coast Claims Facility after the
2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill. See KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT: FAIR COM-
PENSATION AFTER TRAGEDY AND FINANCIAL UPHEAVAL 129–31 (2012); cf. Alex Berenson,
Analysts See Merck Victory in Vioxx Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2007, at A1 (noting that Merck
stock rose 2.3% on news of the $4.85 billion nationwide Vioxx settlement “even as the broader
stock market was sharply lower”); Berenson, Jury, supra note 55 (noting that Merck shares fell
7.7% after the verdict was announced).
87. This was Merck’s public position in the Vioxx litigation prior to entering into a $4.85
billion nationwide settlement. See supra note 17.
88. In the Seroquel litigation, for example, the defendant AstraZeneca settled more than
28,000 claims nationwide despite winning two jury verdicts, prevailing on a motion for summary
judgment in one bellwether case, and having no adverse trial results. See Jef Feeley, AstraZenica
Resolves Most Suits Relating to Seroquel Drug for $647 Million, BLOOMBERG (July 28, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-28/astrazeneca-resolves-almost-all-seroquel-suits-for-
647-million.html; see also Leigh Kamping-Carder, AstraZenica Puts 4K Seroquel Injury Claims
to Bed, LAW360 (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.law360.com/articles/185350/astrazeneca-puts-4k-sero-
quel-injury-claims-to-bed; Brendan Pierson, AstraZeneca Win In Seroquel Bellwether Affirmed,
LAW360 (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.law360.com/articles/160186/astrazeneca-win-in-seroquel-bell-
wether-affirmed.
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of the risk to the firm: the “client” receives the liquidated value of her
claim immediately, while the firm continues to pursue a recovery from
the defendant, the timing and amount of which remain uncertain.
One would expect the amount paid by a firm for a claim to take into
account those increased risks, but the firm’s cash outlay prior to
reaching a settlement with the defendant will in every case be signifi-
cantly greater than under the current regime.
All of this suggests that if the current restrictions on complete alien-
ation of mass tort personal injury claims were lifted, many (perhaps
most) plaintiffs’ firms would continue to conduct business as usual.
They would continue to enter into traditional attorney-client relation-
ships governed by contingent fee agreements and would forego the
opportunity to buy a “client’s” claim outright.  But the possibility that
most firms might not be able or willing, at least initially, to bear the
financial risk and cash outlay that a claim-sale option entails is not a
persuasive argument against providing that option.  Many attorneys
also do not charge for their services on a contingent fee basis, but that
fact alone is not a persuasive argument against offering attorneys and
their clients that choice.  Moreover, as discussed above with regard to
the asbestos bankruptcy claims, there will likely be occasions when a
firm (and its clients) would eagerly take advantage of a claim-sale op-
tion, even if the firm in most instances preferred the traditional con-
tingent fee attorney-client relationship.  In sum, the analysis above
suggests that the benefits to attorneys of a claim-sale option are likely
to exceed any costs.
IV. ANALYZING THE NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE
CLAIM-SALE OPTION FOR MASS TORT PERSONAL
INJURY CLAIMS
Part III has shown that the benefits of a claim-sale option for claim-
ants and attorneys are likely to outweigh any costs, and by a signifi-
cant margin.  In light of that analysis, it is worth critically examining
the normative concerns that arguably underlie the constraints that
currently preclude such sales or that have otherwise been discussed by
scholars in this context.
A prominent argument against the alienability of claims, as embod-
ied in traditional prohibitions against maintenance, champerty, and
barratry, is a concern with promoting or “inciting” litigation, espe-
cially “frivolous” litigation.  In the general mass tort context, however,
there is typically very little litigation in terms of cases tried to a jury,
although there may be many thousands of claims filed against the de-
fendant in various courts.  There is no reason to think that permitting
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claimants to sell their claim outright to an attorney would increase the
number of cases tried to a jury, not least because most mass tort trials
would presumably still take place within the bellwether regime of the
MDL.  The number of claims filed in courts might increase simply be-
cause more injured persons might come forth to sell their claims, but
those filings would rarely represent a potential trial.  Cases would pre-
sumably be filed either to avoid the running of a statute of limitations
or because doing so would be necessary for the purchasing law firm to
“record” or establish ownership of the claim.  Further, one would ex-
pect purchasing law firms to be happy to use less costly alternatives to
formally filing a claim, such as listing it on a tolling agreement or
merely “registering” (rather than filing) it with the MDL court.89
There is also no reason to expect an increase in “frivolous litiga-
tion” under a regime with a claim-sale option.90  As noted above,
there are very few trials involving mass tort cases,91 and mass torts
involving claims of limited merit do not survive summary judgment.92
Neither of these facts is likely to be affected by the addition of a
claim-sale option.  To be sure, within a given mass tort there are al-
ways weaker claims and stronger claims, but the incentives provided
by the contingent fee make meritless claims unattractive investments
for plaintiffs’ lawyers.  There would seem to be even less incentive for
those lawyers to purchase frivolous claims outright since their own
financial risk would typically be greater with no commensurate ex-
pected increase in return on the investment.  Indeed, one might expect
plaintiffs’ attorneys under a claim-sale option to be especially likely to
buy only strong claims for fear that they would not be able to recover
their investment, let alone make a profit, when ultimately negotiating
a settlement with the defendant.
Another type of normative concern with the alienability of claims
focuses on the potential effects on the attorney-client relationship.
Specifically, these concerns include: that acquiring a proprietary inter-
est in the cause of action would interfere with the lawyer’s capacity to
exercise independent judgment in the representation; that if the law-
yer has a proprietary interest in the cause of action, a dissatisfied cli-
ent will have a difficult time discharging the lawyer; and that
89. A case “registration” system, albeit of a somewhat different sort, was part of the nation-
wide Vioxx settlement. See Vioxx Settlement Agreement, supra note 35, § 1.1, at 2–3.
90. For other discussions supporting this claim, see, for example, GARBER, supra note 10, at
31–32; Shukaitis, supra note 18, at 341–43; Jason Lyon, Comment: Revolution in Progress: Third-
Party Funding of American Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 571, 593–94 (2010).  For discussions
arguing against this claim, see, for example, BEISNER ET AL., supra note 2, at 5–7.
91. See supra note 17 (discussing Vioxx litigation).
92. See supra note 88 (discussing Seroquel litigation).
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providing financial assistance to a client would give an attorney too
great a financial stake in the litigation.93  Under a claim-sale option,
however, there would be no attorney-client relationship for claimants
who chose to sell their claims.  Thus, issues concerning the purchaser-
lawyer’s ability to exercise independent judgment or the client’s abil-
ity to discharge the lawyer would never arise.  Nor could the attorney
properly be understood as providing “financial assistance” to a client
in this context; rather the attorney is purchasing an individual’s claim
in an arm’s length commercial transaction, and no attorney-client rela-
tionship in the traditional sense ever exists.  In this regard, it is note-
worthy that the absence of an attorney-client relationship for
individuals who sell their claims will eliminate any concerns, embod-
ied in state rules of legal ethics or elsewhere, regarding the attorney’s
loyalty to her client or agency problems more generally.94
In recent years, scholars have focused on another group of concerns
regarding the alienability of claims.  These include issues of “com-
modification,” procedural justice, and the effects on the legal pro-
cess.95  Although others have provided useful analyses of these issues
with regard to claim sales in general, they deserve a further look in the
special context of mass tort personal injury claims.  The commodifica-
tion concerns related to the sale of legal claims embodies a notion that
an individual’s “personhood” is bound up in the claim and selling the
claim is therefore analogous to, and attended by the same concerns as,
selling one’s bodily organs.96  As others have noted, whatever force
this concern might initially have had is largely lost in a world in which
settlement is available and very few claims are ever tried.97  As ex-
plained above, the typical mass tort claim is even less likely than other
personal injury claims to proceed through trial.  Moreover, the typical
mass tort settlement currently involves the use by the plaintiffs’ attor-
ney of a formula or matrix of some sort to determine the appropriate
settlement offer value for each claim included in the settlement.  It
would not seem that adding a claim-sale option to this regime would
result in any further commodification.  Indeed, under a claim-sale op-
93. See, e.g., ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 15–39; BEISNER ET AL., supra note 2, at 7–9;
Abramowicz, supra note 3, at 717–22.
94. See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 3, at 717–18.
95. See, e.g., id. at 703–11, 722–726; Sebok, supra note 3, at 134–39; Shukaitis, supra note 18, at
344–46.
96. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1855–59 (1987);
see also Abramowicz, supra note 3, at 703–11.
97. See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 3, at 726 (“Because most cases settle, the typical choice
is between market resolution and settlement.  There are good reasons to think that litigants will
react better to alienating claims to third parties than they would to settlements.”).
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tion, a claimant is likely to have a greater ability than at present to
negotiate an individualized value for her claim that more precisely re-
flects those aspects of her claim for which she desires compensation.
The procedural justice concerns that some scholars have raised have
focused on the lower esteem in which some might view the entire jus-
tice system if claim sales were an option, as well as related concerns
regarding the “dignitary” interests of claimants.98  Unfortunately,
there is limited empirical data regarding what “the public” actually
understands or thinks of various aspects of the current civil justice
system or what changes might cause the public to view the system in a
better light.  Nor has there been much systematic study of what mass
tort claimants who have participated in the civil justice system have
most appreciated or would most like to see changed.  In the absence
of such data, one can only speculate.  It is possible, however, that mass
tort claimants would embrace with enthusiasm—and consider more
just—a system that gave them the option to completely liquidate their
claim today for an amount determined within a competitive market,
rather than waiting several years to receive an unpredictable settle-
ment offer that they may have no real choice other than to accept.
The public, too, might consider this an improvement over the current
state of affairs.
Another issue raised by some scholars has been the effects of claim
alienability on the legal process.  The concern is that an injured person
who has sold the entirety of her claim will not be willing to participate
in the legal process with regard to that claim since she no longer has
any financial interest in it.  As discussed above, however, there are
various ways to secure the participation of the claim seller in any fu-
ture legal proceedings, and only a handful of cases in any mass tort are
likely to proceed to trial in any event.  Thus, a claim-sale option is not
likely to pose any special threats to the integrity of the legal process.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has embarked on a thought experiment: What would
the likely effects on claimants and plaintiffs’ attorneys be if an injured
person had the option to sell her entire claim to a law firm rather than
retaining the firm to represent her on a contingent fee basis?  An anal-
ysis of the costs and benefits reveals that both groups would be ex-
pected to prefer such a regime to the current state of affairs.  In
98. See, e.g., id. at 722–26 (discussing these concerns raised by others and noting that the
argument that a market for claims offends procedural justice “assumes that only trial-like proce-
dures can produce feelings of procedural justice”).
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addition, none of the normative arguments against a claim-sale option
that were explored were found to be persuasive in this context.
The implications of this analysis are significant.  If, as this Article
contends, there are no compelling normative or economic reasons to
prohibit the sale of mass tort personal injury claims to attorneys, there
may also be no compelling reasons to prohibit the sale of any type of
claim to any interested purchaser or investor.
To be sure, various practical issues would need to be resolved
before a claim-sale registry could become a reality, including the crea-
tion of a claim registry and the amending of various rules of legal eth-
ics.  And it is far from certain that a market for such claims would
flourish even if the existing constraints on alienability were relaxed.
Most clients and plaintiffs’ firms might well continue to enter into
traditional attorney-client relationships governed by standard contin-
gent fee agreements.  But that possibility is not a dispositive argument
against offering attorneys and injured persons another choice.
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